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I.

Arguments and Authorities
Founded in 1934, the National Stripper Well Association ("NSWA") is

the only national association solely representing the interests of the nation's
smallest and most economically vulnerable oil and natural gas wellscommonly called "stripper" wells. While the idea of having an oil or gas well on
one's property might conjure visions of Jed Clampett striking it rich in the
backwoods, most gas operations operate on slim margins. Stripper wells, in
particular, operate on particularly small profit margins. A "stripper" well is
one that ekes out such small volumes of oil or gas "that the gross income
therefrom provides only a small margin of profit .... " 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS, Stripper Well (2020). For tax purposes,
wells that produce 15 barrels of oil per day or 90 mcf (thousand cubic feet) of
gas per day during a twelve-month period are classified as stripper wells. 26
U.S.C. § 613A(c)(6).
The overwhelming majority of natural gas wells in Kansas are stripper
wells, averaging just 25.1 mcf per day. U.S.E.I.A., U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS
WELLS BY PRODUCTION RATE B30 (2020) (attached as Appendix A). In total,
Kansas has approximately 20,000 of these low-volume gas wells. Id.
Astonishingly, stripper wells represent 97.8% of all Kansas gas wells and
collectively produce over 86% of all Kansas gas. Id. These stripper wells are
essential to the state of Kansas. They make it possible to efficiently recover
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natural gas from mature fields, like the Hugoton Gas Field, which would
otherwise be stranded unproduced and wasted. Stripper wells produce gas that
would otherwise remain underground and, in the process, generate tax
revenue for counties and the state, create jobs for Kansans in rural
communities, and pay royalties to landowners.
The "good faith" argument advanced by the Class in this appeal
threatens the existence of the stripper well industry in Kansas. The Class's
goal is not to quibble about the supposed lack of good faith in one or two
isolated natural gas transactions. Rather, its theory is that producers across
the state are completing "paper title transfers" in bad faith en masse to swindle
the lessors under their leases. This theory is unmoored from the economic
realities of natural gas production and willfully ignores the express language
of the parties' oil and gas leases.

a. The Economics of Gas Sales-In Reality
This case involves sales of raw natural gas at the wellhead of the
defendant's wells to a midstream gas marketing company-a type of
transaction that is ubiquitous in Kansas. The current dispute arises over how
the royalty on these sales should be calculated under the defendant's leases
with members of the Class. Like other commodities such as wheat, gas is
produced as part of a value chain. In wheat production, grain goes through
various improvements and middlemen in its journey from a farm to bread at a
2

grocery store. Each middleman between the farmer and the ultimate consumer
adds value to the product while incurring costs.
Just so for gas. Gas producers typically sell their gas to midstream
marketers. Midstream marketers buy the gas in its raw form in the field and
then resell it at an interstate pipeline spot market after they have enhanced
its value through processing and transportation. The interstate pipeline
operator ships and delivers the gas to utility companies and industrial users.
For a number of reasons, it can be complicated for midstream marketers
and producers to determine the right price for raw gas. One reason is that raw
gas can be processed into multiple different commodities, including natural gas
liquids (like propane) and the residue gas (gas which can be burned for other
uses). Additionally, the composition of a well's production can vary over time.
For example, wells which produce both oil and gas have changing oil-to-gas
ratios. Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988)
(discussing declining oil to gas ratios over the well production cycle). Likewise,
a well's gas quality (and the processing needed to prepare it for later sale)
fluctuates from year to year. To complicate matters further, the price that
natural gas fetches on large commodity exchanges typically changes by the
minute.
In light of these uncertainties, when midstream marketers purchase raw
natural gas at the wellhead of a producer's wells, they determine the purchase
3

price based on a formula rather than a set amount. The typical formula starts
with an index price and then deducts from the price the marketer's costs to
transport and process the raw gas for resale at a distant market. This formula
is usually called the netback or workback method.
The index price is a composite based on a survey of sales that occur over
a given period at a given location (a "spot market"). It does not represent the
price that a willing buyer paid to a willing seller in an actual transaction.
Marketers' gas purchase contracts rely on different spot market indices. The
individual contracts are bought and sold on a commodity exchange by traders
like Eddie Murphy's character, Billy Ray Valentine, in Trading Places. See
TRADING PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983). ("Advise our clients interested in
[pork] bellies to buy at 64. Mr. Valentine has set the price.").
The Class characterizes gas sales under netback pricing contracts as bad
faith attempts by producers like the defendant to steal value from royalty
owners. The story here is that scheming operators are aware of the marketable
product rule and its implications for post-production costs. The Class argues
that rather than making the gas ready for an interstate pipeline themselves,
producers like OPIK are engaging midstream marketers as mere service
providers. As part of their service to operators, the class posits, the midstream
marketers accept faux title to the gas to allow the producers to avoid postproduction expenses. The Class implies that these transfers are not genuine
4

sales-the real gas sales are at some vaguely imagined point downstream. In
short, the Class's argument is that a sale of raw gas at the wellhead can never
be a good faith transaction.
This illustrates the Class's misunderstanding of gas marketing. While
marketers use several variations of the formula, netback pricing is the national
industry norm and has been for decades. As the 2014 amicus brief by DCP
Midstream, LP suggests, other pricing mechanisms are not workable.
[Appendix B]. Through netback pricing, midstream marketers shift the vast
majority of post-production costs to the producer enabling the marketer to
resell the gas, which it owns, at a downstream market for a profit.
Furthermore, midstream marketers such as ONEOK are highly
sophisticated parties and often have dramatically more bargaining power than
producers. This is especially true of stripper well producers. Since each
stripper well produces a small amount of gas, producers are saddled with the
marketer's form contract. Success for such producers is in merely getting the
midstream marketer to commit to buy small volumes of gas at all. For stripper
well producers, these arrangements are essentially non-negotiable contracts of
adhesion. If the producers want to sell any natural gas, they must use a
netback system.
Moreover, once the gas transfers into the marketer's possession, the
operator ceases to have any control over it. The operator does not decide what
5

processing the raw gas undergoes before the marketer sells it at a downstream
market. Neither does the operator have any control over when, where, to
whom, and for how much the ultimate downstream sale will occur. All of these
decisions are made by the owner of the gas after the wellhead sale-the
midstream marketer. Midstream marketers insist upon receiving title to the
gas specifically to ensure they have sole control over the processing,
transportation, and eventual resale of the gas after it leaves the leasehold.
In short, sales of raw natural gas at the wellhead are real sales. This
arrangement exists and is ubiquitous because of the economic constraints of
producing and selling gas, not because of any bad faith or self-dealing.

b. The Economic Impact of the Class's Theory
Importantly, the profit margins for producers on most sales of gas under
these arrangements are slim. Far from being the bonanza for producers that
the Class makes it out to be, the sale of raw natural gas at the wellhead based
on a netback pricing formula is essentially the only means a producer has of
selling the gas economically. Yet, under the Class's theory, a sale of raw gas at
the wellhead can never be a good faith transaction. Instead, the Class urges
that the marketable product doctrine requires royalty be paid on the basis of
the price obtainable at some point downstream of the wellhead.
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Consider the .financial impact of the Class's theory on a hypothetical
stripper gas producer that sells gas in raw form at the wellhead to a midstream
purchaser under a contract containing a .netback pricing formula.
Under Fawcett I, if the producer's lease provides for payment as royalty
"1/8 of the proceeds from the sale of gas as such at the mouth of the well where
gas only is found" or "one eighth (1/8) of the proceeds if sold at the well," it
would calculate the royalty on the basis of the price it actually receives from
the sale to the midstream gas purchaser, which, in turn, would be determined
on. the basis of a price formula that begins with an index price and deducts the
purchaser's processing and transportation costs. If we assume the Henry Hub 1
futures price index reflects a recent average price of $3.00 per mcf and the
netback pricing formula renders proceeds to the producer of $1.00 per mcf,
$0.125 (being 1/8 or 12.5%) would be paid to the lessor as royalty and $0.875
(being 7/8 or 87.5%) would be retained by the producer. If we further assume
that the average monthly expenses to operate the well. amount to $400, the
producer would need to produce and sell 15 1ncf of gas per day to make one
penny of profit for the month.

"Henry Hub: A pipeline hub on the .Louisiana Gulf coast. It is the delivery
point for the natural gas futures contract on the New York l\llercantile
Exchange (NYMEX)." Glossary, U.S.E.LA.,
httrw;.Llww-s,v ,eia.gqy{tG:QJ§i.glossarv/indgx.,I!.b-I!. (last visited June 12, 2021).
1

7

Under the Class's proposed "good faith" theory, however, the producer in
our hypothetical would not be permitted to calculate the lessor's royalty on the
basis of the proceeds it received from the sale of gas to the midstream
purchaser. Instead, the producer would have to calculate the lessor's 1/8
royalty on the basis of the index price, $3.00 per mcf, even though it actually
receives only $1.00 per mcf. Thus, for each mcf of gas sold, the producer would
pay to the lessor as royalty $0.375 and would retain for itself only $0.625. As a
consequence, to make a penny of profit for the month, the producer would have
to produce and sell 21.3 mcf of gas-40% more than it had to produce and sell
under the rule from Fawcett I.
This difference is significant. Based on statistics maintained by the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, approximately 57% of the state's wells
produce 17 mcf of gas per day or less, whereas only 27. 7% of wells produce at
more than 29 mcf of gas per day. See Appendix A. Thus, around 15% of the
state's wells, more than 4,300 wells, could have their economic lives ended
prematurely if the Class's theory were to prevail. These are only the wells that
would no longer at least break even; thousands more would become less
profitable and see their economic lives curtailed, as well. In a low-margin
business like natural gas production, even small changes to the economics can
have significant consequences.
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c. The Legal Impact of the Class's Theory: Waste.
The Kansas Legislature has declared, "The production of natural gas in
the state of Kansas in such manner and under such conditions and for such
purposes as to constitute waste is hereby prohibited." K.S.A. § 55-701. Yet,
adoption of the Class's "good faith" theory would cause the premature
termination of marginal oil and gas leases and the abandonment of stripper
wells and waste the state's natural gas resources. See Broomes, supra, at 18286 (discussing how the marketable product rule causes waste of natural gas).
Kansas law holds that oil and gas leases remain valid only so long as
they can be operated at a profit. Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 253 Kan.
373, 381, 855 P.2d 929 (1993). When production of gas in paying, i.e., economic,
quantities ceases, the underlying lease terminates under the terms of the
typical habendum clause. Additionally, producers must plug and abandon their
wells when they reach the end of their economically productive lives. See K.S.A.

§ 55-179. Thus, by undermining the economic viability of stripper wells, the
Class's theory would cause a chain reaction of lease terminations and well
abandonment.
Prematurely abandoning even low-volume wells causes physical and
economic waste in violation of Kansas law. K.S.A. § 55-701; Kansas-Nebraska

Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm 'n, 169 Kan. 722, 732, 222 P.2d 704, 712
(1950). "Waste" is defined by statute to include, "in addition to its ordinary
9

meaning, ... economic waste, underground waste and surface waste." K.S.A. §
55- 702. Of particular importance here are economic waste and underground

waste. "Underground waste" refers to the physical loss of otherwise recoverable
natural gas reserves. 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW, Waste (2019).

Stripper wells are usually the last producers in mature oil and gas fields.
If stripper wells are prematurely plugged, it is unlikely anyone will drill into
the formation again. As a result, gas which could have been produced will
remain trapped in the reservoir-the very definition of underground waste.
The Class's theory would also cause economic waste by threatening to
cut short the economic life of a substantial number of the state's stripper wells.
If wells are prematurely plugged, the State of Kansas and Kansas counties will
lose tax revenues from gas that will not be produced, producers will lose the
opportunity to make a reasonable return on their stripper well investments,
and rural communities will lose employment opportunities directly and
indirectly related to stripper well production.
Additionally, the Class's theory would harm royalty owners. Lessors
with highly productive wells would temporarily show a benefit from the Class's
calculation. For those royalty owners whose leases are average or worse, the
Class's theory threatens to terminate the lease prematurely and cut off any
further royalty payments. All leases will one day decline and cease to be
10

economically productive. The Class's theory ensures that this day will come
sooner, depriving even its own members of the marginal additional production
that stripper wells provide. Having a right to a larger slice of nothing will be
cold comfort when all the wells are plugged.
Finally, forcing operators to bear these post-production costs will lead to
more abandoned wells. In Kansas, well operators are responsible for plugging
oil and gas wells when they reach the end of their production life. See K.S.A. §
55-179. When operators go bankrupt, they sometimes struggle to plug all of
their wells. Instead, the state must assume responsibility. Due to the cost and
difficulty of plugging wells, many go unplugged for years. See KAN. CORP.
COMM'N, ABANDONED OIL AND GAS WELL STATUS REPORT 4-5 (2021) (5,000
wells requiring action). The state currently has approximately 20,000
unplugged abandoned wells, 5,000 of which currently need action. Id.; Joseph
Schremmer & Charles C. Steincamp, Imputing Regulatory Failures in Oil and

Gas Licensing: A Discussion and Proposal, 57 WASH. L. J. 265, 270 (2018)
(noting the state has approximately 20,000 unplugged wells as of 2018).

d. Avoiding Waste Is Merely a Matter of Enforcing the
Parties' Chosen Lease Language.
Gas producers understand both the economic and the legal implications
of selling gas discussed above, and they have these realities in mind when they
negotiate and draft the royalty clauses of their oil and gas leases. Producers
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typically choose to calculate royalty "at the well" to ensure that even lowvolume or low-quality gas production may be economically viable.
The "at the well" language is a hedge against the uncertainty inherent
in gas production. When they obtain an oil and gas lease, lessees never know
what, if any, oil or gas the lease may produce. They do not know what volumes
of gas they might produce, if any, or what the quality of the gas may be. They
cannot know what the prevailing price for natural gas will be in any given
market, whether at a downstream market or at the wellhead.
The "at the well" language helps ensure that, in light of the uncertainty
inherent in natural gas production, producers of even low-volume or lowquality gas can maintain at least a narrow profit margin. In other words, this
language has meaning and there is a reason that it is used in the vast majority
of oil and gas leases in Kansas, including the Class leases.
The Class's "good faith" theory boils down to this: the parties' reasons for
selecting the "at the well" language do not matter. The Class instead urges that
despite the economic realities undergirding the parties' consensual agreement,
the defendant must guarantee that the Class receive the value of interstatepipeline quality gas regardless of the actual quantity or quality of gas that is
produced from their lands. As now-Judge John Broomes has explained about
the marketable product rule,
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[T]he Marketable Product Rule essentially forces the lessee
to be the guarantor of the physical properties of any natural
gas discovered on the leased premises by requiring the lessee
to bear the risk that gas of lesser quality may be located
thereunder, as compared to better gas that more closely
matches the specifications for pipeline quality. This idea
may be best illustrated through a comparison with hard-rock
mining. If a miner discovers silver on one tract of land and
gold on another, no one expects the miner to pay the silver
royalty owner as if his land produced gold.
Broomes, supra, at 175.
Thus, the Class's "good faith" theory not only ignores the parties' intent,
it deliberately destroys it. It invalidates the arrangement the parties actually
assented to and replaces it with one that no rational stripper well producer
would ever agree to. Fortunately, however, Kansas law wisely protects the
right of parties to contract on their own chosen terms. See Levin v. Maw Oil &

Gas, LLC, 290 Kan. 928, Syl.

,r 2,

234 P.3d 805 (2010) ("The primary rule for

interpreting written contracts is to ascertain the parties' intent."). There is no
reason to believe that the when the parties' wrote "at the well" they meant "at
a distant commodity exchange to be selected by lawyers."
While the Class clearly rejects the possibility that a sale at the wellhead
could be a "good faith" sale, despite the language of the parties' lease, it is not
at all clear at what point they believe a good faith sale is possible. In Fawcett

I, the Court suggested that the Class pressed for valuation at the "interstate
pipeline"-which probably means the FERC price indices referenced in various
13

gas purchase contracts. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 302 Kan. 350,
352, 352 P.3d 1032, 1035 (2015). At other points during this protracted
litigation, the Class appears to have advocated for valuation at yet a different
point, the Henry Hub spot market, where the commodity price would generally
be even higher than the FERC indices.
By not clearly establishing a point of valuation as an alternative to the
wellhead, the Class appears to be leaving itself room to move the valuation
point farther and farther downstream in future litigation. The "good faith"
theory they are advancing in this round of Fawcett fits this strategy. Once a
court establishes that the first sale of gas to a midstream marketer lacks good
faith as a matter of law, royalty owners can start challenging the second sale.
Since natural gas becomes more valuable farther down the line, each
disregarded sale means a larger slice of the proceeds pie for royalty owners.
Finally, by muddying the waters on the correct valuation point, the Class can
claim that there is a factual question in dispute over where the real gas sale
occurs. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 6.
Fortunately, it is possible to avoid the morass of identifying the proper
point for determining the lessor's royalty under the Class leases. The Class
leases expressly set the valuation point at an easily ascertainable and
economically realistic location: at the well. Not only does Kansas law require
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the parties' express language be given effect, in this case the economic realities
of gas product.ion and the public policy against waste demand it as well.

II. Conclusion
In its briefings, the CJ.ass, in spite of the evidence, evokes the myth of a
great conspiracy between operators and 1narketers, and it advances a theory
that threatens impermissible economic and underground waste of natural gas
resources. The language of the parties' oil and gas leases, on the other hand,
sets up bargained-for arrangement that enables the parties to share in the
benefits of stripper gas production and promotes conservation of the state's
natural gas reserves.
/s/ Charles C. Steincamp
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1) Source: State admin1strative oil & gas data thru Enverus Drillinglnfo.
2) The ictal volumes shown tn the distribution tables may not exactly agree with other related data, inc!udfng other ElA sources. Major reasons for d1fferences fnclude: the Urning of updates frorn state and commercial sources,
the summed production of availah(e welt-level produc'!.ion data versus state-level aggregations of production, and how a wHll is defined and which entities aie counted and summed,

3i Welis counted for this report !nclude sidetracks, completions, re-complr,tions and leases, th1s inciudes ail oii and/or gas producing 'entities· available !n Enverus Drillinginfo database.
4) For late reporting states:the last year of available data Is repeated for missing years (AZ 2017 used for 2018·19, KY 2018 for 2019. MD 2015 for 2016-19, TN 2016 for 2017•19). All years are missing for IL and IN.
5) To be consistent between states a GOR of 6,000 (cf/bbl) for each years production was used to detrne oil versus gas weils. if the GOR was less (greater) than 6,000 (cf/bbl) the well was classed an oil (gas) well.
6) To determine prcductiDn rate hracket.~ for the first and last year of a weHs life the annual production was divided

by the number of days in the pro,:!uctive months. For other years the annual production was divided by 365 or 366 days.
7) Gos vo!umes have been converted from the various state pressure bases to the Federal base (i 4.73 psla).
Dqta avaHab!e as of November 2020.

U.S. Energy Information Administration

The Distribution of U.S. Oil and Natura! Gas Wells by Production Rate
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

DCP Midstream, LP ("DCP") submits this amicus brief in support of Oil
Producers Inc. of Kansas ("OPIK") and urges reversal of the Lower Courts' grant of
partial sununary judgment to Plaintiffs. Fawce(t v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 49
Kan. App. 2d 194, 306 P .3 d 318 (2013). As a midstream gas purchaser/gatherer from
OPIIZ and many other producers in Kansas, DCP is filing this brief because of the
importance to the natural gas industry of a predictable legal landscape and the need for
consistent interpretations of the royalty value provisions of Kansas oil and gas leases.
DCP believes that the Court of Appeals opinion effectively rewrites oil and gas
leases that require paying royalty on "proceeds" of sales "at the well." OPIK properly
paid royalties on the total proceeds received in its wellhead sales. By requiring OPIK to
pay royalties on the purchasers' downstream resale price without any deductions, the
Court of Appeals erroneously assumed as a matter of law that the gas was not in
marketable condition at the well. But DCP's gas purchase contracts with OPIK on their
face prove the gas was marketable at the well.

In fact, DCP and its midstream

competitors routinely purchase raw gas at the wellhead under two part payment
percentage of proceeds ("POP") and percentage of index ("POI") contracts throughout
Kansas, demonstrating that the gas is marketable at the well. The Court of Appeals
decision changes Kansas royalty law and will adversely affect midstream purchasers,
producers, and royalty owners.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

1.

The Lower Courts erred in holding that royalties based on the proceeds of
OPIK's sales at the wellhead did not comply with "at the well" lease
language and that the gas was not in marketable condition at the wellhead.
A.

DCP's role as a midstream gas purchaser

DCP is a gas gatherer and processor in Kansas and in many of the producing
states in the Umted States. DCP is not a gas producer, nor is it affiliated with any gas
producer. DCP purchases raw natural gas at or near the wellhead from many Kansas gas
producers, including OPIK. Similarly, DCP is not a party to any lease between OPIK and
Plaintiffs. The terms of the arms' length Gas Purchase Contracts between Kansas gas
producers and DCP determine the producers' gas sale proceeds.
DCP negotiates with producers to purchase gas, typically at or near the wellhead.
DCP then gathers that production, often using compression, and typically delivers gas to
a gas processing plant ~or processing. Processing entails extraction of entrained liquid
hydrocarbons· in the raw gas, generally using cryogenic or refrigeration technologies.
This separation yields raw make natural gas liquids (''NGLs") and remaining residue gas.
NGLs include ethane, propane, butanes, and pentanes and natural gasoline (pentanes+).
DCP and other gas gatherers and processors (such as O:NEOK) add value to purchased
wellhead gas in several ways as they move it toward end consumers. Gatherers' and
processors' contributions toward the higher end values that exist at downstream
consumption points include:
•

receiving the raw gas at many field locations, often at low pressure;

•

dehydrating the gas if not already dehydrated by the producer;

•

compressing gas in the field and at plant inlets to increase pressure to that
needed for processing and for delivery to downstream interstate pipelines and
using fuel to do so;
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•

moving the gas from wellheads to a central processing plant and processing it
to recover NGLs;

•

delivering raw make NGLs to the NGL pipeline connected to the plant;

•

delivering resitjue gas to residue gas transmission pipelines; and

•

marketing and managing deliveries of the residue gas and NGLs that are then
available in high quantities at a single point and at the higher pressures needed
for the deliveries to the downstream takers,

All of this work and activity moves the gas part of the way to the end-use market
and leads to revenues that exceed the wellhead gas values; otherwise, gas gathering and
processing companies could not continue in business. The Cµurt of Appeals' opinion
rests on a misimpression that wellhead gas is not marketable, and thus the producer has to
pay to make it so. This has no basis in fact. In fact, wellhead gas is very desirable for
both its NGLs and gas content, and there is active competition among multiple gatherers
for wellhead gas purchases from gas producers like OPIK.
DCP is actively involved in the midstream segment of tb.e energy industry as the
second largest natural gas gatherer and processor, the largest NGLs producer, and one of
the largest marketers of natural gas and NGLs in the United States. DCP operates 64 gas
processing plants and about 6~ ,250 miles of gas gathering lines in the United States.
These activities occur across 11 different states. DCP handles about 6 trillion Btus (or 6
Bcf) of gas every day, or about 12% of the nation's production, and produces well over
400,000 NGLs barrels per day, or about 17% of all NGLs produced in the United States.

In Kansas, DCP and its affiliates engage in gas gathering, gas processing and
treating, gas and NGLs transmission, and gas, helium, and NGLs marketing. Kansas is of
key impo1iance to DCP operations for a number of reasons. DCP operates gas gathering
and transmission pipelines and supplies gas to the 700 MMcf/day capacity National
Helium Plant near Liberal in Seward County, Kansas, owned by DCP's subsidiary
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National Heliwn, LLC and operated by DCP.

DCP operates about 1,921 miles of gas

gathering lines and operates for others 226 miles of gas transmission lines in Kansas.
DCP participates in an active mark.et for the purchase of unprocessed wellhead
gas all across western Kansas.

DCP has about 327 active gas purchase contracts in

Kansas, with many qifferent suppliers covering 1,336 wells or delivery points near the
wellhead.

B.

DCP's wellhead purchase contracts with OPIK and other unaffiliated
producers

For decades, gatherers have negotiated wellhead sales contracts that value the gas
in a two-part payment based on percentages of the values the processor might receive at
the plant for the residue gas and NGLs portions only after the gatherer-processor has
performed the steps described above. These may be based on published gas index values
("percentage of index" or "POI"), on the gatherer-processor's actual resale proceeds for
both gas and NGLs ("percentage of proceeds" or "POP") or on both published gas and
NGLs index values ("POPI"). These forms of contracting are flexible and market-based,
allowing gas values to change as the downstream residue gas and NGLs values change.
They satisfy a real need for longer tem1 contracts that help to justify the large investments
in gathering, compression, and processing infrastructure need to handle proc,lucers' gas.
They represent the best way to value wellhead gas based on the values that the purchaser
can later derive from it.
Producers and midstream pruticipants have been using POP, POI, and POPI
contracts for many decades. They represent the industry's best thinking on the fairest
way to value wellhead gas by recognizing the purchaser's downstream markets. They are
by no means a recent fraudulent construct to avoid royalties, as the lower courts' opinions
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imply. For gas deliveries at the well, DCP pays producers the full wellhead value in a
two part payment calculation that pays the producer the wellhead value for the NGLs
contained in the gas and for the residue gas remaining and available for sale allocated to
that producer's deliveries.

These values are 100% of the wellhead sale site values.

Typical DCP Kansas Gas Purchase Contracts include these material terms:
(1)

Title usually passes from the producer to DCP at agreed wellhead or

wellhead area Delivery Points, the inlets to DCP gathering systems near each well.
(2)

As the agreed full compensation to the seller for purchase of the raw gas

and all of its constituents, DCP pays a full wellhead value that is usually the sum of two
agreed sets ~f values. The fast is an agreed percentage of the value of the residue gas as
of the plant location tha1 remains and that DCP allocates to that seller's gas quantities.
The second is often the same agreed percentage of the value of the NGLs as of the plant
location .that DCP allocates to the seller based on the tested NGLs quantities in the
seller's raw gas. The residue gas values are today most often based on published index
quotations that apply to sales of gas at high pressure and quantity at gas transmission
pipeline inlets (e.g., interstate pipelines) at the processing plant tailgate. An older residue
gas valuation method, also still frequently used in the industry, is to base the seller's
compensation on the processor's actual residue gas proceeds as of the plant location.
(3)

DCP usually bases NGLs values on the Oil Price Information Service

("OPIS") published NGLs values for NGLs market centers like Conway, Kansas, and

Mont Belvieu, Texas, less a location differential to adjust that market center value to a
plant location value (OPIS less NGLs transportation, fractionation and storage, or

5

«TF&S"). Of course, those values are very close to DCP's actual NGLs sales values, and
DCP sometimes uses actual NGLs values as of the plant location instead.
(4)

DCP sometimes purchases wellhead gas using "percentage of index" or

"POI" pricing where the entire wellhead purchase payment based on a gas index value.
The specific gas purchase contracts that OPIK entered into in Kansas were sales
to ONEOK, UNIMARK, and Duke Energy Field Services, LP ("Duke") (the previous
name of DCP Midstream, LP before January 1, 2007). Fawcett, 306 P.3d at 320. While
the Court of Appeals refers to DCP and "Duke" as separate entities having separate
contracts with OPIK, the record demonstrates they are one and the same. See ROA Vol. 5
Exhs. Q-8. The DCP/Duke contracts dated 8-1-02 and 6-1-03 are both POI contracts.
ROA Vol. 5 Exhs. B-F at 29, 44. These contracts provide for sale by OPIK at a "site at
or near [OPIK's] sources of production." Id. at 30, 45. The price for these sales at or
near the wellhead is based on 100% of the index price published in an industry
publication for Panhandle Eastern mainline pipeline spot gas trades, less a fixed cents per
MMBtu gathering charge to compensate DCP for gathering, compression, and processing
costs and other expenses.

The DCP "billing statement" refmed to in the Court of

Appeals opinion, 306 P.3d at 320, relates to a well covered by the 8-1-02 gas purchase
contract of DCP/Duke, ROA VoL 5 Exhs. Q-S at 5, and shows the calculation of the
contract price of the percentage of a gas price index less the gathering fee.
The ONEOK gas purchase contract with OPIK was a POP wellhead purchase
contract using a percentage of the proceeds of the resale after processing of both NGLs
and residue gas, less a gathering and compression fee. ROA Vol. 5 Exhs. B-F at 2, 23.
The UNIMARK gas purchase agreement with OPIK was a POP field purchase contract
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using a percentage of UNIMARK's resale price, less costs incu1Ted by UNIMARK for
gathering, treating, transportation, and compressing the gas. Id. at 58.

popl and P012 contracts have long been a feature of the natural gas industry. The
Supreme Comt of the United States, the U.S. Comt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and
courts in other jurisdictions with robust oil and gas law have uncritically described
wellhead POP and POI contracts (formerly called. "casinghead gas contracts") without
voicing any doubt as to the _legitimacy or validity of these agreements.

See Phillips

Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Duke Energy Natural Gas Corp. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 172 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999); Deep S. Oil Co. of Tex. v.
1

Fed. Power Comm n, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. I 957); Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
247 S.WJd 690, 708 (Tex. 2008) (citing Williams & Meyers at 751); Tana Oil & Gas

Cmp. v. Cernosek, 188 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied). See also
Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.RD. 632, 638 n. 10 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (finding no
material distinctions between POP and POI contracts and thus referring to both as POP
contracts). The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized such contracts as "common
throughout the natural gas industry." Dynegy Midstream Servs., Ltd P 'ship v. Apache

Co1p., 294 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tex. 2009). Thus, POP and POI contracts are widely used
and accepted in the natural gas industry.

C.

Contrary to the unsupported assumption by the Lower Courts,
OPIK's gas was marketable at the wellhead where it was purchased.

1
A POP contract is "a gas purchase contract providing payment to the purchaser as a percentage of the
proceeds realized by the purchaser upon the resale of gas." Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d
690, 708 (T~x. 2008) (8 Williams & Meyers, Oil & Gas Law: Manual of Oil & Gas Tenns ("Williams &
Meyers"), at 751 (2007)).
2
A PO! contract is a contract in which payment is based on "a percentage of the month's prices under an
index-based gas value fonuula for the aggregate MMBtus at the wellhead." Naylor Farms, Inc. v.
Anadarko OG_C Co., No. CIV-08-668-R, 2011 WL 7053789, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2011).
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The court in Fawcett held that OPIK violated the implied covenant to market.

Fawcett, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 207-08, 306 P.3d at 326. In Fawcett the court has turned the
marketable product into a rule of law that the location for calculating royalty must be at
the transmission pipeline. Fawcett, 49 Kan. App. 2d 194, 203-04, 306 P .3d 318, 324.
The court appears to base this conclusion on the fact that the midstream purchasers from
OPII( at the wel1s resold the gas at downstream mainline pipelines. But nowhere in the

Fa:wcett decision does the court address whether the gas was marketable at the well.
At most, Kansas' implied duty to market in oil and gas leases requires only that
the gas be "marketable"-not that it exhibit all attributes of mainline transmission quality
gas.

There is ample evidence of the existence of wellhead markets for raw gas in

wellhead quality and condition. Gatherers like DCP eagerly vie against each other to buy
wellhead gas, in its raw, unprocessed fonn.

DCP and other midstream companies

routinely enter into wellhead purchaser contracts. Those arms'-length wellhead bargains
agreed between producers and wholly unaffiliated gatherers result in good faith deals at.a
full 100% of wellhead value. POP and POI contracts cause producers and royalty owners
to bear their share of expenses necessary to obtain higher prices in the separate residue
gas and NGLs markets that gatherers and processors can access after they contribute
significant value through their gathering and processing activities.
Gas has typically been marketable at the wellhead since the 1920s. See, e.g.,
While "interstate pipeline quality" gas 'is

www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9l90us3a.htm.

unquestionably "marketable" at inlets to interstate pipelines, as it is in a fom1 suitable for
use by residential end users, that does not mean the gas is not marketable in raw
unprocessed form at the we1lhead. Reaching ''interstate pipeline quality'' at tbe wellhead
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is not an attribute of being "marketable," Multiple buyers and alternative commercial
uses do not require "interstate pipeline quality" gas.

In fact, unlike transmission

pipelines, gatherers and processors like DCP very much prefer the NGLs contained in th.e
I

gas, and they would far rather have raw gas with NGLs content for processing than
"interstate pipeline quality gas," from which NGLs content bas been removed.
The Court of Appeals opinion appears to rest on the assumption that the OPIK gas
sold to DCP, ONEOK, and UNIMARK was not marketable at the wellhead, even though
it was actually sold and marketed at the wellhead to a buyer not affiliated with OPIK.
This finding not only ignores undisputed controlling facts and defies common sense, but
also completely ignores the marketing realities in the natural gas industry.

DCP's,

ONEOK's, and UNIMARK's wellhead purchase contracts with OPIK are more the rule
than the exception. Most natural gas produced in Kansas is sold at the wellhead to
gatherer processors such·as_DCP under wellhead purchase contracts. There is a vigorous
and active·wellhead raw gas market. Of course,.there ai-e downstream markets for natural
gas as well, One such market exists at the tailgate of gas processing plants where treated
and processed natural gas ·is sold in large quantities by gatherers such as DCP to
purchasers transporting on interstate or intrastate mainline pipelines. The POP and POI
contracts of DCP, ONEOK, and UNIMARK with OPIK. allow the producers and their
associated royalty owners to share in the benefit of a downstream pipeline price for the
raw gas purchased at the wellhead from the producer. There are other market locations
even further downstream, sometimes thousands of J?iles away from the point of
production, at city gate locations where local utilities purchase at the tailgate of interstate
pipelines.

And of course, there is a retail consumer market for natural gas where
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residential and commercial customers purchase natural gas at their places of residence
and business. Each step in the chain of commerce adds value that the end consumer must
pay, or the product would not be available for long. However, the fact that there are
multiple downstream markets for natural gas does not establish that there is no market for
natural gas at the wellhead.
The concurri~1g opinion of Justice McAnany in the Court of Appeals decision
illustrates how far from the realities of the mar~etplace the Fawcett opinion strayed. The
concurring opinion stated: "I do not ascribe to the notion that because there is some point
on every such curve where somebody would be willing to pay for the item, each and
every item passes the test of marketability." Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318, 327.

By that

statement the court apparently assumes that wellhead sales under POP and POI contracts
are outliers. To the contrary, they are the norm,
In order to affinn summary judgment, the Court of Appeals necessarily held as a
matter of law that the OPIK gas sold at the wellhead was not marketable at the wellhead

even though the undisputed evidence was that the gas was sold to an unaffiliated
purchaser at t11e wellhead. The court cites no factual evidence in the record that proves
that the OPIK gas was not marketable at the wellhead, nor any evidence that the
producer's "gross proceeds" are the "at the plant" values that include the gathererprocessor's entire margin on its resale.

The court simply divined that the "gross

proceeds" are the "at the plant" values implicit in the purchase contracts, not the actual
wellhead values paid to OPIK., Then the court stated there could be no "deductions." ~ut

OPIK made.no "deductions" at all. Sure, the gas purchaser made adjustments to calculate
the full wellhead values, but these were not "deductions" from the producer's real "gross
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proceeds." OPIK already paid royalty on its actual gross proceeds. The court's opinion
is based solely on its conclusion that the proper "gross proceeds" include the producer's
value plus the entire gross margin of the gatherer-processor implicit in the terms of
OPIK's wellhead sale contracts with DCP, ONEOK, and UNIMARK. But if anything,
those contracts demonstrate just the opposite of the court's conclusion. They prove that
the gas was in fact marketable at the wellhead and was indeed marketed.
That raw gas at the wellhead is in marketable condition is shown by how
widespread such wellhead purchases al'e.

DCP has approximately 327 active gas

purchase contracts in Kansas with 1,336 delivery points at or near the wellhead,
Once a producer makes a sale at the wellhead at anns' length to an unaffiliated
purchaser, it has fully satisfied any implied obligation to market gas under the oil and gas
J

lease, The resulting wellhead values are appropriate full royalty values.
The Court Appeals here made the same enor as the class ·of royalty owners in a
Texas case which rejected claims that resale prices in POP contracts should be the basis
for royalties in "at the well" leases: "The Class erred by equating the sale of raw gas at

the well to the separate and distinct third-party sales of the residue gas and extracted
liquids on the open market . . . . Accordingly, by paying the Class royalties based on
100% of the money il actually received, Tana did in fact pay royalties on 100% of the
total volume of raw gas that it sold at the well." Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 188 S.W.3d at
360.

D.

The Lower Courts' holding is contrary to Kansas law, would re-write
"at the well" leases, and is based on erroneous factual assumptions.

The OPIK oil and gas leases state that royalty will be calculated "at the mouth of
the well" or "at the well." Fawcett, 49 Kan, App. 2d at 195, 306 P.3d at 320, Had the
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leases specified that the valuation of the production would be "at the mainline" instead of
"at the well," the result urged by Plaintiffs and adopted by the Court of Appeals might
have made sense. Instead, the Lower Courts effectively rewrote the lease terms to reach
their result. But that approach is contrary to Kansas law. In Sternberger v. Marathon Oil

Company, 257 Kan, 315, 894 P.2d 788 (1995), this Court looked to the express terms of
the oil and gas lease to decide the case. Although the court found that Marathon had an
implied covenant to market the gas, it held the oil and gas lease· provided that royalty
would be determined "at the well." Id. at 322, 894 P.2d at 794. The Court held:

Scott, Voshell, and Molter are dispositive of the issue in this case. These
cases clearly show that where royalties are based on market price "at the
well," or where the lessor receives his or her share of the oil or gas "at the
well/' the lessor must bear a proportionate share of the expenses in
transporting the gas or oil to a distant market.

Id at 324, 894 P.2d at 796.
In Sternberger the issue was whether Marathon could deduct what it incurred to
provide gathering services to move the gas from the wellhead to a mainline pipeline. In
contrast to Sternberger, there is actually no issue for OPIK regarding what the producer
may "deduct" from its sales price. In Sternberger, the producer (Marathon) owned the
well and the gathering system, and gathered and transported the gas to downstream sales
locations where the gas was actually marketed, raising the issue of whether transportation
and other costs incurred by Marathon itself prior to sale were deductible. In the instant
case, however, OPIK transferred title to DCP, ONEOK and UNIMARK at or near the
wellhead, where the gas is both marketable and actually marketed,· and the producer

(OPIK) deducted nothing from the proceeds it received from those midstream purchasers
in rµ-ms' -length sales transactions. Nothing in Sternberger requires OPIK to do anything
else in marketing gas and paying its royalties.
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This Court reaffirmed that the express lease te1ms govern in Coulter v. Anadarko

Petroleum Corp., 296 Kan. 336, 292 P.3d 289 (2013).

There, this Court held that

''(p]arties to an oil and gas lease are free to modify or change the terms of their
agreement, and their express contractual provisions shall control over general statutory
provisions, public policy concerns, or implied covenants." 292 P.3d at 292, Syl. ~10.
Courts in other jurisdictions have agreed on the meaning of the "at the well" lease
language. See Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th
Cir. 1984) ('"[A]t the well' refers not only to the place of sale but also to the condition of
the gas when sold. 'At the well' means that the gas has not been increased in value by
processing or transportation."); Heritage Res., Inc. v. Nationsbank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 12930 (Tex. 1997) ("The words 'at the well' should be given their straightforward
meaning. Market value 'at the well' means the value of gas at the well, before it is
transported, treated, compressed or otherwise prepared for market."). By authorizing the
sale of gas "at the well," therefore, the leases permit the sale ofraw gas at the well and
the payment of royalty from the proceeds of such sales of unprocessed raw gas.

In

Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 296 Kan. 336, 292 P.3d 289 (2013), the Court
revisited Sternberger and clarified the rule when the gas is marketable at the wellhead:
The lessee (oil and gas company) must bear the entire expense of producing the
gas at the wellhead pursuant to the terms of the oil and gas lease. Additionally,
the lessee must also bear the entire cost of petting the gas in condition to be sold
pursuant to the court-made "marketable condition rule." But once the gas is in
marketable condition, regardless of whether a market actually exists at that point,
the lessor (royalty owner) can be charged with his/her/its proportionate share
(e.g., 1/8) of the cost to transport the gas to a market and a proportionate share of
the cost to enhance the value of the gas stream, e.g., the processing costs to
extract a saleable component such as helium.
292 P.3d at 306.
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Because there is no basis for the Court to assume that gas sold by OPIK was not
in marketable condition at the well, and because the gas purchase contracts and all the
industry evidence demonstrates the gas was marketable at the well, Kansas law requires
that OPIK. pay royalties exactly as it did.
ll.

The Holdings of the Lower Courts Would Undermine the Sanctity of
Contracts and Have Adverse Consequences for Royalty Owners~ Producers,
and Midstream Purchasers.
A.

The Lower Courts' decisions could undermine lease contracts and gas
purchase contracts,

To pennit the Court of Appeals opinion to stand is to bless judicial rewriting of
both gas purchase contracts and leases. If Favi1cett is not reversed, producers will, in the
short run, be forced to impute downstream prices they can never receive to the royalty
share of production. In the long run, industry standard POP and POI contracts like those
between DCP and its Kansas gas suppliers would be threatened.

Producers may be

reluctant to enter POP and POI contracts with gas purchasers iftl:ey must pay royalties
on the gross amount of the resale of gas and NGLs by the midstream purchaser. But the
alternative to POP and POI contracts would be fixed price wellhead purchase contracts
that would deprive producers (and royalty owners) the benefits of at least a percentage of
the downstream market prices.

A fixed price contract would avoid the alleged

"deductions." But the term could not be much beyond one month due to fluctuating
energy values, and monthly new contract negotiatiops or amendments would be
necessary, burdening the industry greatly.

Obviously, for any longer term midstream

purchasers would be required to offer fixed prices lower than the POP and POI net prices
to account for the additional market price risk to the midst.ream companies of buying gas
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at a fixed wellhead price and reselling at changing spot prices at mainline pipelines. In
the end, producers and royalty owners would suffer.
B.

The Lower Courts' decisions would ultimately reduce natural gas
production in· Kansas, reduce payments to producers, and reduce
royalty payments.

The Court of Appeals' opinion threatens to undermine the reliability of contracts
that form the basis for economic development. If Fawcett increases producers' royalty
obligations materially beyond those initially agreed, producers will respond by finding
fewer well prospects to be economic or shut in wells sooner, reducing gas supplies, and
by shifting investment dollars out of state. These avoidable market distortions will injure
the long-term interests of both the natural gas industry and ultimately royalty owners. As
nothing in prior Kansas law warrants or requires these results, DCP urges the Court not to
impose such adverse consequences on the natural gas industry.

CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Lower Courts granting partial summary judgment to
Plaintiffs should be reversed. This Court should correct the errors of law in the Lower
Courts' opinions and clarify the correct legal standard for royalty payments in Kansas
when gas is sold by processors at the wellhead to gas producers like DCP.

Curtis M. Irby, #7274
GLAVES, IRBY AND RHOADS
155 North Market, SuiJe l 050
Wichita, Kansas 66202
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